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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
practice first occurred in New York in the case of Bensbn v. Dean,19 and the.
rule as set forth therein has been applied by the New York Courts ever since20
In a situation such as this, the average person through common sense could
determine that assaults on a patient such as were alleged here are incompatible
with any recognized and valid medical treatment, and therefore expert testimony
would not be necessary, and the defendant should have the burden of justifying
such acts. The amount of damages could be determined by the jury and would
be for injuries sustained, and pain, and suffering which flow from the tortious
acts.2 '
Defendant also contends that the malpractice cause of action is barred
by the statute of limitations of two years, and further that plaintiff is not en-
titled to an extension under Section 60 of the New York Civil Practice Act;
2 3
because although the patient was purportedly still suffering from schizophrenia
at the time the action was commenced, she had not been adjudged incompetent
and therefore Section 60 would not apply. The Court states that it makes no
difference whether plaintiff was legally adjudged incompetent or not if she
was in fact insane at the time of the commencement of the action.24 It would
appear then, that a judgment of incompetency will not be necessary in order
to receive the extension benefit under Section 60. However, as there was no
expert testimony that the patient was still insane at the time of the commence-
ment of the action, it appears that the second argument of the Court in
finding that the action was indeed timely was better. This argument was based
on the fact that the course of treatment, during which the assaults occurred,
had continued up until 1955, the year in which the action was commenced.
Where the treatment, out of which the charge of malpractice arises, continues,
then the statute of limitations on the cause of action does not begin to run
until the treatment ceases.
25
PRESUMPTION OF PERMISSIVE USE UxE R SECTION 388 (FoRmERLY SEcTioN 59)
OF VEHICLE AND TRAFFiC LAW
In New York, when permission to use a motor vehicle is in issue in a
19. Ordinarily, jurors would find difficulty, without the help of medical evidence,
in determining the xight of a patient to recover against his physician for mal-
practice based on acts of scientific skill, but the results may be of such a character
as to warrant the inference of want of care from the testimony of laymen or in
the light of the knowledge and experience of the jiirors themselves. 232 N.Y. 52,
56, 133 N.E. 125, 126 (1921).
20. Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., supra note 17; Isenstein v. Malcolmsan, supra
note 14; Simon v. Frederick, 163 Misc. 112, 296 N.Y. Supp. 367 (City Ct. 1937).
21. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E2d 330 (1955).
22. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 50(1).
23. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Art. § 60 provides for an extension of time beyond the Statute
of Limitations period, where a party, at the time a cause of action occurs, is insane.
24. Chilford v. Central City Cold Storage Co., 166 Misc. 780, 3 N.Y-S.2d 386 (Sup.
Ct., 1938) had taken the reverse position in construing § 60.
25. Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct., 1923); Gillette
v. Tucker, 67 Ohio 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
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negligence suit, a statutory presumption establishes permission by the owner
to the driver involved.26 The burden is thus shifted to the owner, if he wants
to deny that the vehicle was operated with his permission, to come forward
with credible evidence upon that issue. Absent credible evidence to the con-
trary, the presumption will stand and the jury may rely upon the presumption
standing alone to establish consent to operate the motor vehicle.
In Burmaster v. State2 7 a District Game Protector set out upon a 130 mile
trip from Saranac Lake to Massena and back. He was concededly on state
business but he took his wife (the instant plaintiff) along to spell him at the
wheel in case he became fatigued, as he was 69 years of age. During the course
of the trip he had an accident in which plaintiff (his wife) was injured.
The State's defense was that the Game Protector was prohibited by a
State directive from carrying members of his family to and from their respec-
tive places of work or for other purposes not strictly in the line of duty. The
directive permitted, however, the carrying of other persons in the state owned
vehicle if their presence in some way tied in with state business. The Court of
Claims found that the Game Protector was negligent and his wife (plaintiff)
was free from contributory negligence but dismissed the claim on the theory
that the directive, above stated, prohibited the transportation of members of
the family in state owned vehicles. It concluded that the directive rebutted the
presumption of consent, by the owner, which arises under Section 388 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Appellate Division reversed and found that the
plaintiff was in the vehicle to aid her husband in his performance of state busi-
ness, to wit, to drive if he became fatigued.28 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Appellate Division both as to its construction of the meaning of the direc-
tive and its findings of fact.
The Court of Appeals rejected the construction of the State that the
directive prohibited the presence of his wife in the vehicle whether on state
business or for her personal pleasure. It construed the directive to allow other
persons to ride along whether members of the Game Protector's family or not,
if such persons "tied in with the work to be performed.1' 2 9 The weight of the
evidence clearly showed, the Court felt, that the wife went along on the trip
to help drive, and that this purpose tied in with her husband's work and was
in accordance with the directive.
In view of the fact that state ownership is the same as private ownership
under Section 388,30 there is clear precedent for the instant decision.8 1 The case
26. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388.
27. 7 N.Y.2d 65, 195 N.YS.2d 385 (1959).
28. 7 A.D.2d 775, 179 N.Y.S.2d 980 (3d Dep't 1958).
29. Supra note 27 at 66, 195 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1959).
30. Winnowski v. Polito, 294 N.Y. 159, 61 N.E,2d 425 (1945).
31. Lamica v. Vollmer, 270 App. Div. 1063, 63 N.Y.S.2d 31 (3d Dep't 1946), aff'd
296 N.Y. 660, 69 N.E.2d 817 (1946).
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reaffirms the manifest policy of Section 59 to hold owners liable when some
one else operates these vehicles negligently, unless it is clearly and unambigu-
ously shown that it was without their permission.
VIOLATION OF TRE BUILDING CODE AS EVIDENCE or NEGLIGENCE
In New York, a cause of action based upon common law negligence places
a burden on the plaintiff to show an absence of contributory negligence.
The State Legislature may, however, create by statute, a standard of care
or duty for the protection of a specifically designated class, the infraction of
which will be conclusive of negligence. The resultant liability attaches regard-
less of negligence and is recognized only when the courts find that the statute
manifests a legislative intent to that effect. Once this absolute statutory liability
has been determined, contributory negligence is of no consequence.
32
The plaintiff in Major v. Waverly and Ogden, Inc. 33 was injured in a fall
on stairs unprotected by a handrail and lacking illumination. Both deficiencies
were in violation of regulations promulgated by the State Building Commission.
The Code had been adopted by the village in which the building, an apartment
house, was situated.34 The defendant, owner of the building, claimed that the
plaintiff, a guest of his tenant, was guilty of contributory negligence.35 The
trial court agreed and the plaintiff, upon appeal, reiterated her allegation that
the defendant's infraction was conclusive of negligence and objected to the
trial court's instruction that it was incumbent upon her to dispel any evidence
of contributory negligence.
The regulations of the building code were promulgated by the Building
Code Commission under authorization set forth in the Executive Law.36
The verdict for the apartment owner was unanimously upheld by the
Appellate Division 37 and the Court of Appeals. 8
The opinion considered and distinguished the case of Koenig v. Patrick
Construction Co.3a which had been cited by the plaintiff as an impelling
precedent for her contention that proof of a violation of the Building Code was
itself conclusive evidence of negligence.
That case held that a failure by an employer to provide safety devices for
the injured employee in contravention of specific requirements of the Labor Law,
made the infraction subject to an absolute statutory liability. The language
32. Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
33. 7 N.Y.2d 332, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).
34. Once adopted by the political subdivisions, the Code took the effect of law therein
and amendments, additions and revisions by the State Building Commission were auto-
matically incorporated into the local ordinance.
35. The plaintiff was visiting at a friend's apartment in the defendant's building and
was watching television in the otherwise darkened livingroom. She rushed to find the bath-
room, opened the wrong door and fell down the unlit stairs.
36. N.Y. Executive Law § 374-a.
37. 8 A.D.2d 380, 190 N.Y.2d 526 (2d Dep't 1959).
38. Supra note 33.
39. Supra note 32.
